Over ten years building products for tens of millions of customers across India and the Middle East. I've been an early employee (one of Delhivery's first 30), a founder (Zealth), chief of staff to a CEO (Hike), and a product leader at Zomato, Amazon and Careem, where I lead New Bets in AI and Enterprise today.
Along the way I've built businesses to $100M in recurring revenue, turned a 250-city P&L from -20% to +16% EBITDA, and led teams from a close group of seven product managers to a 230-person organisation through a pivot.
Pick the closest fit. The headline, the evidence and the order of the case studies change to match.
Roles that own a marketplace, partner platform or contributor network: onboarding and listing, payouts and incentives, trust and quality on both sides.
Roles that take AI from demo to daily use: choosing the problem, proving it against a baseline, rolling it out safely and measuring adoption.
Roles that sit with a client or a business unit and deliver change: AI transformation, forward-deployed product work, strategy that ends in something running.
Roles that own acquisition, activation, conversion and revenue: freemium to paid, pricing and fees, experiments that decide what ships.
Roles that own the consumer experience, loyalty and retention: why people come back, and what they're rewarded with when they do.
Roles in e-commerce, food delivery and quick commerce: selection, sellers, fulfilment speed and unit economics.
Roles in health tech, wearables and consumer apps: privacy and consent, daily habits, and partners in the care system.
Roles where the product runs on fleets, devices, networks or deliveries: operations at scale, safety, and rollout across many markets.
Roles in fintech, payments and B2B products: money movement, billing, spend controls and the deals behind them.
Each one came from a project that would have gone worse without it.
Minimum lovable, not minimum viable. A narrow scope, finished properly, beats a wide one nobody comes back to.
The grocery list did one thing well: 65% of adopters were back within two weeks.The interesting work is usually the goal other teams have already decided can't move.
At Careem's AI hackathon every vertical passed on grocery basket size. We took it.A working thing ends a debate faster than a better slide.
A prototype I built on Lovable settled the grocery list design; a fake-door page proved Careem for Business in two weeks.Discounts move a number this month and train customers forever.
Instead of a big-basket discount, country-of-origin tags made quality visible.I build it, run it until it works, and leave it with the team that owns it.
Ask Careem reached ~98% accuracy and regenerates its own documentation as features ship.The underlined side is the one I owned. The lever is what I changed to move the whole market.
Lever: let vetted partners plug into payments, discovery and demand; add companies as a paying side through a funded wallet.
Lever: get five partner groups onto one consent-based record, with the patient in control.
Lever: two currencies, a pay-to-play loop for the freemium tier, and VIP tiers.
Lever: make a micro-seller's first 100 orders succeed, and give buyers a trust signal for good brands.
Lever: unlock new supply (cyclists, part-timers) and pay each rider cohort through its own rate card.
Lever: turn a once-in-a-lifetime purchase into a repeat and referral loop.
Lever: move risky long-tail shippers from credit to a prepaid wallet.
Open any case for the problem, the decision, the mechanism and the result. Newest first.
Careem had payments, discovery, a user funnel and advertising. It did not have fulfilment for the long tail of services people want. Tenants let local businesses plug into everything else.
Building every service vertical in-house (car rental, laundry, home cleaning, pet grooming, gardening, e-bikes) would never pay back. Careem's vision was one app for everything, in every market.
Open the platform instead of funding verticals. Any provider, once vetted by Careem and agreed on commercials, could sell through Careem. Fulfilment stays with the partner.
Swapp had powered car rental on Careem since 2022, but by the time I joined the partnership was strained. I took it over, rebuilt the joint roadmap with them, and in six months the business looked very different. Once a proof of concept on the new model was confirmed, I took the partnership to an exclusivity deal with equity for Careem: Careem's first stake in one of its partner apps, announced in 2025. Careem now drives about 96% of the partner's GTV.
20+ partners in Dubai, 15 in Jordan and 7 in Egypt within six months. Careem went from about 5% of partner business at launch to about 96% of a car-rental partner's GTV and about 92% of a home-services partner's. Customers who adopted a partner service tripled their spend on the app (45%+ of adopters).
Support tickets in the last five days of every month were dominated by one request: tax invoices. The people asking were being reimbursed by employers. So the employer became the customer.
While running a care-automation programme, the share of agent-only tickets rose to about 70% at month end, driven by invoice requests, in the UAE, KSA and Jordan alike. Careem issued receipts, not tax invoices.
Interviews with 15+ users across three markets found employer reimbursement of 20 to 40 trips and orders a month. The surprising segment was real-estate agents. The idea had been shelved before, so the case had to prove demand first.
A fake-door page I built on Lovable, shown only to the cohorts asking for invoices. It drew 200+ forms from about 70 companies in two weeks, mostly 100 to 400 staff, with typically only 20 to 30 employees per company already on Careem. That gap was the expansion case.
Launched lean: a Lovable site, an ops dashboard and spreadsheets until traction was proven. I sold the first accounts myself, with no sales, TPM or commercial support. After the business crossed $200K a month, three months in, it got its first sales rep, then moved to the commercial org: build, operate, transfer. It now runs with its own sales, invoicing and compliance team, and grew beyond the UAE and KSA into Jordan and Egypt.
New business accounts as the north star. Revenue is the output, not the target.
Photograph a list, paste one forwarded on WhatsApp, or speak to an agent. Version one ran on human transcribers, so the model had a baseline to beat before it shipped.
Quick commerce trains people to top up, not stock up. Raising order value was the one goal every vertical declined at the company hackathon I created. My team took it.
Users uploaded list photos and internal agents transcribed them by hand. The LLM replaced the humans only after it matched that baseline. Out-of-stock items are shown up front with a "back in stock tomorrow" tag, to protect trust.
22% week-one adoption against a 5 to 7% target, 65% of adopters repeating within two weeks, adopter order value from about 70 to about 250 AED. A falsified hypothesis (people kept browsing aisles after finishing their list) became a second product: a "people also buy" strip at checkout. Uber and noon shipped equivalents within about two months.
A charter that started as three people and became the implementation partner for every vertical, now building on Claude Code.
A retrieval assistant over Confluence, Notion and Drive, inside Slack, that raises Jira tickets and can run a workflow on click. Agent actions were tested against a shadow replica of the production stack before launch. Documentation regenerates into the index whenever a feature ships, and thumbs up or down feedback runs after rollout.
Rebuilt the merchant platform after benchmarking Keeta and DoorDash, for four roles: owner, manager, restaurant staff and kitchen staff. AI menu scoring, categorisation and ranking, image quality checks and a dynamic pricing engine lifted merchant revenue 24% and cut onboarding from 6 days to 1.
Built an analysis skill (cross-analysis, dependencies, leakage detection) that is published on Careem's internal skill marketplace and used across the company.
A company-wide hackathon where each vertical submitted its own top problems against the company's goals, so priorities came from the businesses rather than from me.
As co-founder and CPO, I built a consent-based health-records layer on India's ABHA rails, the way payment apps sit on UPI. It only worked if five partner groups took part: the government, insurers, hospital chains, diagnostic labs and private clinics.
Patients carried paper files between hospitals that would not accept each other's reports, so tests were repeated and no doctor saw the full history.
Five partner groups, each with a different reason to join:
For patients, one longitudinal record with time-limited consent per doctor. For doctors and labs, a patient-history and reach-out tool. Zealth was deliberately not a provider, payer or insurer, but the neutral layer a health marketplace could be built on.
Doctors and labs adopted it, and the pilot earned revenue. When the government deprioritised ABHA, I shut Zealth down rather than spend limited capital waiting. The lesson I carry: a platform built on someone else's rails needs a plan for when those rails move.
As Chief of Staff to the CEO, I ran the pivot from messaging to gaming and the economy that paid for it.
Piloted formats against each other (real-money, hyper-casual and strategy, web3 and non-web3) before committing. Hike's strengths in matching, relays and concurrency pointed to player-versus-player hyper-casual games.
Web3 tokens worked as game mechanics, but interviews showed players did not care about owning NFTs. We kept the mechanics (collect, upgrade and morph pawns) and dropped the web3 cost.
Two currencies, a pay-to-play loop for the freemium tier converting 8% of new users to paid each month, and Rush VIP tiers that raised spend 30% and D30 retention from 12% to 30%. Made A/B testing and pricing governance the default path to ship, improving margins 20%.
Led a 230-person cross-functional team through the pivot in 6 months to $100M in recurring revenue, profitable from day one, reporting to the CEO, Board and investors.
I visited micro-merchants in their stores. The new ones were lost, and many went to cyber cafes to use a web-first seller portal. So we rebuilt it mobile-first, from India for the world.
As single-threaded owner of seller success, I set the goal as doubling onboarding success, measured on a seller's first 100 orders.
The north star was "shutdown", the time the app showed nothing deliverable, and the goal was zero. Paying more bought only marginal supply. Unlocking new supply changed the curve.
80 to 85% of peak orders were within about 3 km, and serviceability rules switched off long-distance restaurants at peak. Requiring a motorcycle was an artificial filter on supply, while milk and newspaper delivery riders on cycles sat idle at lunch and dinner.
Higher rider incentives, surge-style customer pricing, restaurant self-delivery, or new supply. I chose new supply, where money had an inverse relationship with partners.
A customer-facing "cyclist or biker" choice raised complaints while measured ETAs differed by only 30 to 45 seconds, so I kept it hidden. The first assignment rule angered bikers waiting outside restaurants, so a fast-follow made assignment concentric: cyclists first close in, bikers otherwise.
One payout structure per city could not pay a two-hour cyclist and a twelve-hour biker fairly. We rebuilt payouts in six phases, down to rate cards for cohorts as small as 10 riders.
Built Zomato's first promotion platform in 2018 and 2019. Bank, wallet, partner and Gold offers stacked automatically in one cart with a single total, instead of making customers do the maths. The same platform set the structure for platform fees, which could be added, removed and targeted by cohort.
Deployed the Karma Score ML fraud system, cutting platform abuse 90%, and a dynamic pricing engine that improved margins 18%. Unit economics on a 250-city P&L moved from -20% to +16% EBITDA on a $20M budget.
Honeymoons to island destinations: high ticket, very high acquisition cost, and about 5% repeat over nearly five years. One purchase could not pay for the customer who made it.
Travellers, the local travel agents who sold and planned the trips, and the on-ground providers who delivered them. I structured all customer feedback by agent, location and itinerary, so we could nudge travellers before known on-ground problems hit, and set expectations where nothing could be fixed.
When one person in a group marries, many more follow over the next few years. We built a referral reward mechanism and a loyalty rewards programme, and made trips generated per converted traveller the north star. One conversion translated into about 20 trip conversions.
Weekend getaways near Mumbai, Pune, Bengaluru and Delhi gave travellers a reason to come back every year, and a place to redeem referral points. At one point we sent more than 8,000 people on offbeat trips such as Rishikesh.
A retargeting and lead-scoring engine on 25+ profile attributes, and a 40-person CX team, improved lead-to-conversion 23%.
Small e-commerce sites would launch, sell through short-form content and close within three or four months, which was exactly the credit line logistics extended.
New long-tail shippers moved to a prepaid-only model until they reached a set number of orders, through a closed B2B wallet. It recovered $3M in unrealised revenue and cut leakage 95%.
Indian addresses are free text. AddFix clustered variants of the same address by learning from successful deliveries, giving routing and capacity planning a structured location. It was later offered to Amazon as a service.
Four levers, four goals. It's a toy, but the trade-offs are the ones I worked through at Zomato.
You run food delivery in one city. Hit all four goals at once: 5,500+ orders a day, delivery in 30 minutes or less, riders earning ₹900+ a day so they stay, and no loss on each order.
You balanced it. Here's what happened for real.
At Zomato, most orders came from within about 3 km of the customer, so I built a cyclist fleet for short trips: 90K cyclists from zero, carrying 43% of orders at 50% lower cost, taking cost per order from about ₹120 to about ₹78. Rider pay moved to rate cards for cohorts as small as 10 riders. Across 250 cities the P&L went from -20% to +16% EBITDA.
Read the full caseA toy model. Its numbers are illustrative, not Zomato data. The results in the green box are real.
The role, line by line, against the work above.
I've been the platform (Careem), the seller side (Amazon), the operator paying supply (Zomato) and the matchmaker between three sides (Travel Triangle). Partners and buyers are both people I've built for.
Prepaid B2B wallets, rider payouts, company spend policies, offer stacking and platform fees. A marketplace is only as trusted as its ledger.
I ship with Claude Code, publish skills, and built this site, my last fake-door pages and several products end to end myself. I would be a Marketplace partner's PM and its customer at once.
| The role asks for | Where I've done it |
|---|---|
| Own the marketplace end to end, onboarding and listing through purchase and billing | Tenants (vetting, commercials, listing on shared rails) and Careem for Business (admin workspace, funded wallet, checkout toggle) |
| Commercial workflows that meet finance, audit and compliance needs | DMiles prepaid B2B wallet, Zomato payouts built with the finance org, company spend policies at Careem |
| Commercial incentives built into the product | Cohort rate cards at Zomato, the referral loop at Travel Triangle, the Hike economy |
| Built with or shipped on LLMs | AI grocery list, Ask Careem, a skill published on Careem's internal skill marketplace |
| Go-to-market and partner deals | Swapp exclusivity and equity deal at Tenants; selling with and to enterprises at Careem, Amazon and Delhivery |
| Partner, app store or ecosystem experience | Platform side at Careem, seller side at Amazon, operator side at Zomato |
| Zero to one | Tenants, Careem for Business, the Hike pivot, Zealth |
| Define success metrics | "Shutdown at zero" at Zomato, trips per converted traveller at Travel Triangle, new accounts at Careem for Business |
What share of a partner's new enterprise revenue does the Marketplace source, and is that share growing?Measured before: Tenants partner GTV, ~5% to ~96%.
When committed spend goes to a partner, both finance teams need the same record of what was drawn, against which contract, and when. The ledger is part of the product.Built before: DMiles and the Careem for Business wallet.
How long from a partner submitting to an enterprise buying through procurement, and which step loses the most partners?Cut before: merchant onboarding, 6 days to 1.
A partner program with one set of terms will fit the median partner and nobody else. Which cohorts need their own terms?Built before: Zomato rate cards for cohorts as small as 10 riders.
These are questions, not claims about how the Marketplace works today. Facts about it come from the linked public sources.
Every partner product I've owned had a commercial motion attached, and I carried it until a sales team could.
Signed Tenants partners on agreed commercial terms across three countries, turned around a strained partnership with Swapp into an exclusivity deal with equity for Careem, and built lasting partnerships with Justlife and Washmen, and sold Careem for Business to its first companies myself.
Owned seller success for the micro-sellers behind 80% of India volume, and built Top Brands so D2C brands could sell on trust signals.
Moved B2B shipper accounts onto the DMiles prepaid model, and AddFix, our address engine, was later offered to Amazon as a service.
With Claude Code, Lovable and Replit, the distance between an idea and a working product is mine to close.
A baby-care app on Firebase, with per-baby access controls and an audit step when family members are added, so shared households keep private things private.
A fitness and wellness web app with a 45-exercise library, body-composition logging and goals, deployed on Cloudflare Pages.
A multi-pod venture review skill, and a competitive app-teardown skill that pulls from app store feeds and Product Hunt.
The Careem for Business fake-door page and the grocery list prototype that won the form-factor debate, both built by me.
Searches the case studies on this page. Every answer names where it comes from.
The side of the market I owned changed every time. The job didn't: make that side want to stay.
Among the first 30 employees. The DMiles prepaid wallet recovered $3M and cut leakage 95%.
Read the caseWeekend getaways drew 90% of repeat travellers and 40% of revenue within six months.
Read the caseA 90K-cyclist fleet from zero; a 250-city P&L from -20% to +16% EBITDA.
Read the caseMobile-first onboarding for micro-sellers: $130M incremental revenue.
Read the caseA two-currency economy: $100M recurring revenue, profitable from day one.
Read the caseOne of the first five companies in India's ABHA sandbox; five partner groups on one record.
Read the casePartner GTV driven by Careem from ~5% to ~96%; LLM products and AI across the company.
Read the caseTenants, Careem for Business, Careem Plus and the AI Enablement charter. Seven direct reports: five PMs and two APMs.
Health-records network on India's ABHA rails: one of the first five companies in the government sandbox, with government, insurer, hospital, lab and clinic partners.
Messaging to gaming pivot and the Rush economy.
Seller onboarding, Top Brands, the seller quality engine, founding team of India Ultrafast Fresh.
Fulfilment, rider payouts, promotions and fraud through growth from 5 to 500 cities.
Repeat and referral loop, weekend getaways, lead scoring.
Among the first 30 employees. DMiles and AddFix.
Top 5% of batch.
Top 1% of class, President of India Scholarship. Founded Unnayan, which gave 7,000+ village students free tuition from student volunteers.
At university I founded Unnayan, which gave 7,000+ village students free tuition from student volunteers. It was my first marketplace: volunteers on one side, students on the other.
Cubby, a baby-care app with per-baby access controls, and Journey Log, a fitness app on Cloudflare Pages. Both built for my own use, and both finished properly.
Brand design, and orchestrating several AI models and agents to work together. This site was built with Claude.
Tell me about the role, or better, the problem everyone around you has written off. Based in Dubai, open to relocation.